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THE FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF A CORPORATE DIRECTOR
Cleaveland D. Millert
The obligations of a director to the corporation and its stockholders
are frequently unknown or confusing to an individual assuming
such a position. The author discusses the director's exposure to
liability and delineates the major areas of responsibility which
determine a director's standard of performance.
The duties imposed upon a corporate director and the liabilities which
follow a breach of those duties are issues which have continuously attracted
the attention of legal writers and puzzled the courts. Rather than melding
into a consistent approach to these issues, the divergence of viewpoints
concerning a director's duties and liabilities has increased in recent years.
Some commentators have suggested that knowledgeable and experienced
directors will be difficult to attract if legal trends toward increased liability
continue.' Others feel that the possibilities of directors incurring liability
are not unduly severe. 2 Still other concerned authors suggest that, if a
consistent body of law does not emerge in this area, directors will be
discouraged from the diligent and proper performance of their duties.3 Thus
it has been said that an entirely different approach to corporate manage-
ment, completely redefining a director's duties and responsibilities, is
necessary.4
Given this diverse and unsettled body of judicial precedent and scholarly
commentary, how is a lawyer to advise his client who is involved in or
seeking a corporate directorship? 5 The purpose of this article is to examine
t A.B., 1960, Johns Hopkins University; L.L.B., 1963, Harvard University; Partner in
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1. Farrell & Murphy, Comments on the Theme: "Why Should Anyone Want to Be a
Director?", 27 Bus. LAW. 7, 15 (spec. issue, Feb. 1972):
[B]usinessmen of the caliber we would want ... feel or they... seem to feel the
same, that the harassment, the public scrutiny, the threat of litigation, and the
responsibilities that go with the job [of being a director], simply aren't worth the
offsetting benefits.
2. Bishop, Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate
Directors and Officers, 77 YALE L. J. 1078 (1968).
3. Conrad, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence, 1972 DUKE L. J. 895
(No. 5).
4. See generally Vagts, The European System, 27 Bus. LAW. 165 (spec. issue, Feb. 1972);
Vagts, Reforming the "Modern" Corporation: Perspectives from the German, 80 HARv. L.
REV. 23 (1966).
5. Judge Gerhard Gesell addressed this problem in Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat'l
Training School for Deaconesses and Missionaries, Civil No. 267-73 (D. D. C., filed Jul.
30, 1974). While the court refused to hold directors of a non-profit hospital corporation to
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the duties and potential liability of directors with an eye toward advising a
client how to avoid or mitigate his exposure to personal liability.
The duty of a director in any situation depends upon the totality of the
circumstances. 6 While the facts and issues of a particular case will control
the court's evaluation of its merits, a director should be aware of certain
factors which have elicited a consistent reaction by the courts. If the issue is
negligence in the supervision of employees, the size of the corporation is an
essential element. 7 If diversion of corporate opportunity is charged, the time
lag between the corporation's initial rejection of the opportunity and the
acceptance by the director is key.' If a breach of the standard of care is
alleged, the fact that the director is also an attorney is significant.9 Finally,
an element which is becoming increasingly important is the status of the
director as "inside" or "outside" in all situations where knowledge is an
essential element for liability."°
An inside director is one who also functions as an officer of the
corporation. Because of his dual capacity he has two avenues of communi-
cation and interaction with the corporation. As an officer he is involved in
the day-to-day operations and decisions of the corporation. As a director, he
is additionally involved in broad policy considerations of the company. His
increased opportunity to be aware of the details of the corporation's activ-
ities imposes upon him a higher standard of care than that expected of the
outside director. "l As a practical matter, the latter often has no contact
with the corporation except for annual or semi-annual board meetings. His
input and influence is generally limited by his lack of involvement. While
apathy or lack of presence will not excuse him from his duties as a director,
his outside status will probably weigh against liability when all the circum-
stances are evaluated. 12
Besides the factual elements which may underly a director's liability, the
legal conceptualization of his position is an equally important concern.
While a director is traditionally thought of as a fiduciary, 3 such an
a higher standard of care than other directors, it found liability for breach of their
fiduciary duty of care in the exercise of corporate management. The remedy allowed by
the court was unique. Judge Gesell ordered that all directors of the corporation for the
next five years read the opinion in this case to understand and appreciate the
performance expected of them.
6. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
7. Id.
8. Faraclas v. City Vending Co., 232 Md. 457, 194 A.2d 298 (1963).
9. Cf. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
10. For a discussion of the increased significance courts are giving to the status of directors as
"inside" or "outside," see 27 Bus. LAW. 123, 32-46 (spec. issue, Feb. 1972).
11. Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. N.Y. 1968); see also the early
Illinois case of Walleck v. Billings, 277 Ill. 218, 115 N.E. 382 (1917), where a similar
distinction was made between resident and non-resident directors. This case demon-
strates that increased access to information which precipitates increased liability of
directors is not a new principle. Rather it is a logical conclusion when viewed as one more
factor in the totality of the circumstances.
12. What the SEC Experts of Corporate Directors, SEC Press Release, Wash., D.C. (Dec.
17, 1974).
13. Lawson v. Baltimore Paint & Chem. Corp., 347 F. Supp. 967, 977, (D. Md. 1972); Parish
v. Milk Producers Ass'n, 261 Md. 618, 679-80, 277 A.2d 19, 47-48 (1971); 3 W. FLETCHER,
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approach to analyzing liability may be misleading. It is true that, as a
manager of the corporation, a director is responsible for the proper
utilization of investment funds with which the shareholders have entrusted
him. This responsibility has led to the notion that a director stands
somewhat in the position of a trustee. 4 Nevertheless, there are numerous
instances in which the director's conduct is not judged by the traditional
concepts of fiduciary duty, but rather by principles of agency or approaches
independent of either fiduciary duty or agency.15
Therefore, rather than analyze the liability of a director solely within the
law of fiduciaries, the analysis will be approached through three major areas
of responsibility. These areas of analysis, which will assist the director in
predicting the consequences of his behavior, will be discussed in the
following order:
I. The duty of loyalty-This is the most all-encompassing of a director's
responsibilities. It requires that a director never realize personal gain at the
expense of stockholders of the corporation, or because of his position as a
director. 6
II. The duty to exercise proper business judgment and avoid gross negli-
gence- 7 In Maryland the standard of care imposed upon the director is
that he not conduct the business of the corporation in a grossly negligent
manner. 18
III. Statutory responsibility-Besides the obvious need to comply with
the terms of the local corporate code, a director must be careful not to
violate federal and state securities laws.
I. THE DUTY OF LOYALTY
This duty affects all actions of a director in his official capacity which
relate, in any way, to his personal interests.'9 The scope of liability is very
broad in this category, but most actions commonly fall into one of four
areas: conflicting and competing interests, purchase and sale of control,
declaration of dividends, and the usurpation of corporate opportunity.
CYC. CORP. § 838 (perm. ed. 1965): "Directors and other officers, while not trustees in the
technical sense in which that term is used, occupy a fiduciary relation to the corporation
and to the stockholders as a body."
14. Id.; see also H. BALLENTINE, CORPORATE LAW § 66 at 167 (rev. ed. 1946) (Where the
,corporation is in receivership, the position of director may be accurately described as that
of a trustee).
15. Traditionally, a fiduciary is not excused from liability for error because he has relied on
counsel's advice. See, e.g., Brown v. Fidelity Union Trust Co., 135 N.J. Eq. 404, 414, 39
A.2d 120, 127 (1944). A director, however, who has acted upon the advice of counsel has
generally been absolved of liability. See, e.g., Gilbert v. Burnside, 13 App. Div. 2d 982,
983, 216 N.Y.S.2d 430, 432 (1961).
16. Indurated Concrete Corp. v. Abbott, 195 Md. 496, 74 A.2d 17 (1950).
17. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 125 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
18. Parish v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers' Ass'n, Inc., 250 Md. 24, 242 A.2d 512 (1968).
19. Litwin (Rosemarin) v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667, 667-68 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
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A. Conflicting and Competing Interests
Problems concerning a director's duty of loyalty most often arise because
of potential or actual conflicts between his personal interests and the
interests of the corporation. The most obvious conflict arises when a
director enters into a contract with his corporation. The prevailing rule. in
the nineteenth century was that any contract between a corporation and a
director was voidable at the election of the corporation or its stockholders.
20
In 1880, the Supreme Court considered the possibility of conflict when
certain directors of a railroad company caused it to enter into a contract
permitting another company to exploit the coal reserves which lay within
the railroad's right-of-way. 21 Control of the second company soon passed to
these directors. Speaking for the Court, Mr. Justice Field stated:
It is among the rudiments of the law that the same person can-
not act for himself and at the same time, with respect to the same
matter, as the agent of another whose interests are conflicting.
Thus a person cannot be a purchaser of property and at the same
time the agent of the vendor. The two positions impose different
obligations, and their union would at once raise a conflict between
interest and duty; and, "constituted as humanity is, in the majority
of cases duty would be overborne in the struggle."
22
Initially Maryland did not follow the majority rule, but adhered to an
even more stringent position. The first Cumberland Coal case 23 held that
any act of a director in which he had a personal involvement was ipso facto
void. 24 Due to the inflexible nature of this position, the rule was relaxed
shortly thereafter in the second Cumberland Coal case. 25 Maryland adopted
the majority rule -that transactions by interested directors are voidable and
the burden of proving fairness is affirmatively on the director.
The present state to which the majority rule has evolved is that if proper
disclosure has been made, a contract will be approved if it passes the
independent scrutiny of the courts. 26 While the director still has the burden
of convincing the court of his good faith and fairness,2 7 the court will enforce
20. Wardell v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 651 (1880).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 657-58.
23. Hoffman Steam Coal Co. v. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co., 16 Md. 456 (1860).
24. Id. at 507-08.
25. Cumberland Coal & Iron Co. v. Sherman, 20 Md. 117 (1863). It is interesting to note that
the court in this case equated the shareholder to a cestui que trust. As discussed above,
modern law does not hold a director to the strict fiduciary standard of a trustee. Blake v.
National Research Ass'n., Inc., 466 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1972).
26. Chesapeake Constr. Corp. v. Rodman, 256 Md. 531, 261 A.2d 156 (1970).
27. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Mardel Sec., Inc. v. Alexandria Gazette
Corp., 320 F.2d 890 (4th Cir. 1963); Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas v. Riffe, 381 F.2d 646 (10th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 822 (1967); Chesapeake Constr. Corp. v. Rodman, 256
Md. 531, 261 A.2d 156 (1970); Cummings v. United Artist Theatre Circuit, Inc., 237 Md.
1, 204 A.2d 795 (1964); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., -Del. Ch.- 249 A.2d
427 (Ch. 1968).
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the contract if the totality of the circumstances show that it was "fair,
above board and entered into in good faith. 2 8 The precise language of the
test varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but the result is the same. The
Maryland Court of Appeals has said that such a transaction "will always be
scrutinized and, if shown to be unfair and entered into in bad faith by the
corporate officer, nullified .... "29
Finally, it is necessary to examine the corporation's by-laws and charter,
and the applicable statutes with regard to indemnification provisions.
3
0
Clauses in the charter and by-laws are often drafted in extremely broad
language and purport to absolve the involved director of any liability, if
disclosure is made, short of fraud.3 1 The validity of such clauses has
generally been upheld32 and may be effective to shift the burden of proving
fairness from the director to the person attacking the transaction. 33 Such a
clause, however, will not preclude a court's careful examination of the
fairness of the contract and, the clause should not be relied upon as a device
which will materially change the common law rule.
3 4
Another relatively recent development is the enactment of state statutes
generally permitting transactions between a director and his corporation if
certain standards are met. Delaware, for example, provides that such a
transaction shall not be void or voidable because of the relationship or
because the interested director participated in the meeting of the board
which approved the transaction. The director's action must satisfy the
following criteria: there must be proper disclosure; it must be approved by a
majority of the disinterested directors or by the stockholders; it must be fair
to the corporation at the time it is approved or ratified. 35 Similar statutes
are contained in the corporation codes of California, 36 New York 37 and a
number of other states. 38
28. 3 W. FLETCHER, CYC. CORP. § 919 (perm. ed. 1965); see also Chesapeake Constr. Corp. v.
Rodman, 256 Md. 531, 261 A.2d 156 (1970).
29. Chesapeake Constr. Corp. v. Rodman, 256 Md. 531, 536, 261 A.2d 156, 158 (1970). The
Connecticut Supreme Court has stated that such dealings
are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and must be shown to be in good faith and con-
tain inherent fairness to the corporation. "The essence of the test is whether or not
under all the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an arm's length
bargain." Osborne v. Locke Steel Chain Co., 153 Conn. 527, 534, 218 A.2d 526, 531
(1966).
30. It is increasingly common for corporate by-laws to contain indemnification clauses to
reimburse directors for negligence claims against them.
31. A provision which purported to relieve the director of liability for fraud would probably be
void and unenforceable as being against public policy. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 64
(1973), which limits indemnification to those instances in which the director acts in good
faith.
32. Piccard v. Sperry Corp., 48 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd per curiam, 152 F.2d 462
(2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 845 (1946); Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33
Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
33. Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398, 417, 8 N.E.2d 895, 907 (1937).
34. Abeles v. Adams Eng'r Co., 35 N.J. 411, 173 A.2d 246 (1961).
35. DEL. ANN. CODE title 8, § 144 (a).
36. CAL. CORP. CODE § 820 (West 1955).
37. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (McKinney 1963).




B. Purchase and Sale of Control
Directors breach their fiduciary duty when they make use of the issuance,
sale or purchase of stock by the corporation for the purpose of maintaining
or obtaining voting control.3 9 If manipulation of control is the primary
motivation behind the board's stock transaction, the court will not uphold
it. 40 Directors do not breach their. fiduciary duty when they engage in a
corporate stock purchase or sale which has a valid corporate purpose, even if
the incidental effect is the perpetuation of their own control. 4 1 Thus, while
there is no easy answer to the questions involved in control by incumbents,
the validity of the board's action is generally determined by the intent of
the transaction and not by its ultimate effect.
The determination of intent is a product of the circumstances. A factor
which weighs heavily against liability is the proven necessity to protect the
corporation from being overrun by an outsider who is not likely to advance
the interests of the corporation. That is, the case may revolve around the
characterization of the person seeking control as a "raider" rather than an
analysis of a director's duty. Several leading Delaware cases demonstrate
the point.
In Cheff v. Mathes42 the court upheld the directors' purchase of corporate
stock with corporate funds. It reasoned that since the outsider seeking
control was not highly regarded by certain bankers and had been instru-
mental in the liquidation of a number of companies, the directors were
justified in their effort to thwart the outside bid for take-over. This was
consistent with the court's previous statement that the purchase of a
corporation's own stock is a valid method of eliminating what the directors
deem to be a threat to the business.
43
In Kors v. Carey, U Company had 16% of L Company's stock and was
attempting to gain control. L Company's directors learned of certain
business policies of U Company which they felt were adverse to the
corporate interest. To protect the corporation, L Company's directors used
corporate funds to repurchase U Company's interest. 44 U Company
contended that L Company's directors executed the repurchase solely to
perpetuate their own control. In upholding the directors' action the court
stated that purchase of the corporation's own stock is a valid method of
eliminating what the board of directors ascertain to be a threat to the
business. The court rejected the contention that the directors manipulated
the corporate stock for the purpose of retaining control.
On the other hand, the court found no business justification under similar
facts in Condec v. Lunkenheimer Co.45 C Company bought slightly more
39. Yasik v. Wachel, 25 Del. Ch. 247, 17 A.2d 309 (Ch. 1941).
40. Cummings v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 237 Md. 1, 20, 204 A.2d 795, 805
(1964).
41. Mortgage Bond Ass'n v. Baker, 157 Md. 309, 145 A. 876 (1929).
42. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
43. Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (Ch. 1960).
44. Kors v. Carey, 158 A.2d at 140. The directors contended that United Whelan Corp.
policies might have violated the Robinson-Patman Act.
45. 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (Ch. 1967).
[Vol. 4
A Director's Fiduciary Duties
than one-half of the outstanding shares of L Company. Shortly thereafter,
the directors of L Company voted to issue 75,000 of authorized but unissued
shares of L Company's stock which lowered C Company's control of L
company to below fifty per cent. Plaintiff C Company alleged that this
stock issuance served no legitimate corporate purpose and was done by L
Company directors to further personal interests. L Company's president
responded that the board disapproved of C Company's control because C
Company had excessive debt, too much dependency on governmental
business, a low profit record and a bad business reputation. The court
rejected this defense, finding that C Company's control did not represent a
sufficient threat to the continued existence of L Company.
While the cases seem to reach opposite conclusions under similar circum-
stances, there are several important factual distinctions. Probably the most
important of these is that in Kors the interest involved was only 16% while
in Condec an existing interest of more than 50% was reduced to less than
majority. When only a minority interest is involved and the director's jobs
are not being immediately threatened, the court is more likely to accept the
directors' business explanation for their actions.4 6 Also in Condec the di-
rectors took affirmative action to flood out C Company's existing control,
while in Kors the directors effected a simple repurchase to prevent the pos-
sibility of future control.4 7
C. Declaration of Dividends
Within the restrictions contained in the charter, the declaration of
dividends is in the sound discretion of the directors. 48 A conflict of interest
may arise in dividend policy where it is in the interest of the directors not to
declare proper dividends. This situation exists in a closely-held corporation
which has outside non-director shareholders. The inside directors, though
they also may be substantial stockholders, may be reluctant to declare
dividends as they may be receiving large salaries from the corporation.
They have no desire to receive dividends, particularly when such funds will
not be deductible by the corporation and will be taxed to them.
Nevertheless, because of the discretionary power of dividend declaration,
it is difficult for minority stockholders to maintain a successful action
against the directors in order to compel them to declare dividends. The
courts are reluctant to substitute their business judgment for that of the
directors. Appearing to overlook the inherent conflict of interest, the courts
have stated that:
In order to succeed in such an action minority stockholders
assume the burden of demonstrating that the directors have acted
46. Cf., Lawson v. Baltimore Paint & Chemical Co., 347 F. Supp. 967 (D. Md. 1972); Sterling
v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93 A.2d 107 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
47. See, e.g., Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136 (Ch. 1960); Martin v. American
Potash & Chemical Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d 295 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
48. Schmitt v. Eagle Roller Mill Co., 199 Minn. 382, 388, 272 N.W. 277, 280 (1937); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 23, § 37 (1967).
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in bad faith, fraudulently or dishonestly in establishing the
dividend policy of the corporations.
49
Although the directors of a corporation occupy a fiduciary
relationship toward the stockholders... the declaration of a divi-
dend rests in their sound discretion and one will not be compelled
unless they act fraudulently, oppressively, unreasonably, or un-
justly. 5'
The same conflict generally does not exist in the large corporation since
the failure to pay dividends will normally result in a lower market price for
its stock and the increased danger of a proxy fight or tender offer. In
addition, the officers generally do not own sufficient stock to be concerned
with the double taxation applicable to dividends.
The language of the courts indicates that the conflict of interest inherent
in dividend declaration is not subject to the same fairness test as applied to
other transactions between the corporation and the director. 5'
D. Diversion of Corporate Opportunity
Directors are not, by reason of their fiduciary duty, precluded from
entering into a business enterprise similar to that of the corporation they
serve.2 2 However, when a business opportunity exists which will fulfill a
corporate purpose, a director's fiduciary duty demands that it be taken
advantage of for the corporation and not for his individual benefit. 53 The
difficulty, in this otherwise straightforward area, is determining what is a
corporate opportunity. As in most areas of fiduciary duty of directors, the
totality of the circumstances approach is generally employed.'
4
A corporate opportunity is anything that can be construed to be a
corporate purpose or integral thereto." For example, while a director may
purchase the corporation's stock in his personal capacity, if the corporation
had declared the repurchase of its own stock as a valid corporate purpose,
the purchase by the director would breach his duty.56 Without a corporate
49. Cashman v. Petrie, 14 N.Y.2d 426, 428, 201 N.E.2d 24, 25 (1964).
50. Schmitt v. Eagle Roller Mill Co., 199 Minn. 382, 388, 272 N.W. 277, 280 (1937).
51. See Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259
(1967); Note, 56 NW. U. L. REV. 503 (1961); Note, 10 RUTGERS L. REV. 723 (1956).
52. Poole v. Miller, 211 Md. 448, 459, 128 A.2d 607, 613 (1956). The court ruled that since the
leasehold interests held by the director were not desired by the lessee corporation, the
latter lost nothing. The court seemed to equate loss with corporate purpose. Rather than a
discussion in terms of loss or gain to the corporation, a more accurate statement of the
result would be that the leasehold interest was not a corporate purpose. Therefore, no
opportunity was diverted.
53. Faraclas v. City Vending Co., 232 Md. 457, 194 A.2d 298 (1963).
54. Paulman v. Kritzer, 74 Ill. App. 2d 284, 294-95, 219 N.E.2d 541, 546 (1966). See also
Fuller, Restrictions Imposed by the Directorship Status on the Personal Business
Activities of Directors, 26 WASH. U. L. Q. 189 (1941); The Corporate Opportunity
Doctrine, 18 SW. L. J. 96 (1964); Walker, Legal Handles Used to Open or Close the
Corporate Door, 56 NW. U. L. REV. 608 (1961).
55. Burg v. Horn, 380 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967).
56. Faraclas v. City Vending Co., 232 Md. 457, 194 A.2d 298 (1963).
[Vol. 4
A Director's Fiduciary Duties
declaration or a show of cause for the purchase, some states have ruled
that the acquisition of its own stock is not "ordinarily an essential corpo-,
rate function." 5 7
The corporation's ability to take advantage of the opportunity is another
factor to be considered in the totality of the circumstances test. While some
jurisdictions have allowed a director to seize an opportunity which the
corporation was financially unable to pursue,"' others have vigorously re-
jected this approach. 59 The Second Circuit argued:
If directors are permitted to justify their conduct on such a
theory, there will be a temptation to refrain from exerting their
strongest efforts on behalf of the corporation since, if it does not
meet its obligations, an opportunity of profit will be open to them
personally.
60
A leading Maryland corporate opportunity case"1 supported this criticism of
the more liberal jurisdictions. In that case, the corporation was insolvent
when it purported to redeem its own stock. The corporation's insolvency
made it illegal for it to execute the transaction.6 2 Nevertheless, because
insolvency is not necessarily permanent, the court found that the corpora-
tion's attempted repurchase established its intent. The acquisition of stock
by the director was in conflict with that purpose and was a diversion of cor-
porate opportunity. 63
A corporate opportunity may be implied as well as expressed. A
corporation which leases its premises has as its implied corporate purpose
the renewal of the lease. A director who, in his personal capacity, leases the
corporation's premises upon the expiration of the existing lease, usurps a
corporate opportunity. 64 Generally, anything that is essential to the
corporation's existence in its present operations would be an implied
corporate purpose.
If the board of directors has formally rejected a proposed venture,
however, in certain instances a director may take advantage of it without
breaching his duty. In a Delaware case, the board of directors of a company
rejected an offer to purchase a package of shares of H Company plus a large
quantity of its own shares. 65 One month after the board's rejection, a
57. Equity Corp. v. Milton, 42 Del. Ch. 425, 213 A.2d 439, 443 (Ch. 1965), affd, 43 Del. Ch.
160, 221 A.2d 494 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
58. See, e.g., Santarelli v. Katz, 270 F.2d 762 (7th Cir. 1959); Schildberg Rock Products Co. v.
Brooks, 258 Iowa 759, 140 N.W.2d 132 (1966); Financial Inability as a Defense under the
Corporate Opportunity Doctrine, 39 Ky. L. J. 229 (1951).
59. Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d 121 (2d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 294 U.S. 709 (1935);
accord, Paulman v. Kritzer, 74 111. App. 2d 284, 219 N.E.2d 541 (1966), affd, 38 111. 2d 101,
230 N.E.2d 262 (1967).
60. Irving Trust Co. v. Deutsch, 73 F.2d at 124.
61. Faraclas v. City Vending Co., 232 Md. 457, 194 A.2d 298 (1963).
62. MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 32(c) (1970).
63. Faraclas v. City Vending Co., 232 Md. 457, 194 A.2d 298 (1963).
64. The Acker, Merrall & Conduit Co. v. McGraw, 106 Md. 536, 68 A. 17 (1907).
65. Kaplan v. Fenton, 278 A.2d 834 (Del. Super. 1971).
1975]
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director of the corporation purchased the previously-offered stock of H
Company. During the vote taken by his board, when the opportunity
initially arose, the interested director had favored the purchase of H
Company stock but voted against the purchase of the corporation's own
stock. Also before buying the H Company stock, he had asked the president
of his corporation if he wanted the offer to be resubmitted to the board. The
response was negative. Nearly a year later, the board sought to acquire all of
H Company's stock. The purchase included the director's shares. The
corporation sued him for the profit he made on the resale to his own
company. The court found that he did not usurp the corporation's
opportunity to acquire the stock, and thus was not bound to pass on his
profit to the corporation. The court considered the corporation's rejection
absolute, making the transaction non-essential to the conduct of its
business in the estimation of the board of directors. It said:
'[Wihen a business opportunity comes to a corporate officer or
director in his individual capacity ... and the opportunity is one
which, because of the nature of the enterprise, is not essential to his
corporation, and is one in which it has no interest or expectancy, the
officer or director is entitled to treat the opportunity as his own,
and the corporation has no interest in it, if, of course, the officer or
director has not wrongfully embarked the corporation's resources
therein. '66
If there had not been such overwhelming evidence of the director's good
faith, the court might have found diversion of corporate opportunity.
When diversion of corporate opportunity is found to exist, a constructive
trust may be imposed upon the profits diverted from the corporation to the
interested director.
6 7
II. THE DUTY TO AVOID GROSS NEGLIGENCE
A director can control his integrity and is therefore required by the law to
do so. On the other hand, he is human and subject to ordinary, undesirable
human characteristics such as misjudgment and negligence. Because the
courts recognize that these shortcomings exist, the courts do not look for
infallibility of a director in the performance of his duty.68 Instead, a director
is liable only for gross negligence and culpable mismanagement. 6 9
Historically in Maryland "the onus of the proof of... gross negligence,
to render the directors personally liable is upon the party making the
66. Id. at 836 quoting, Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503, 510-11 (Ch. 1939).
67. Craig v. Graphic Arts Studio, Inc., 39 Del. Ch. 447, 166 A.2d 444 (Ch. 1960).
68. Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md. 419 (1881). The court said: "Blunders of the grossest sort are
readily tolerated, if they can be attributed to anything short of fraud. It is fraud alone
that will render a director personally responsible .... Id. at 426. This is somewhat of an
overstatement of the law as it has developed today. Gross and "culpable" negligence are
actionable without fraud. 1 HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 235 (2d ed. 1970).
69. Id.
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charge.... ''70 The policy behind this result is that to hold a director
personally liable for an unwise decision is to discourage all responsible
people from acting as a corporate officer or director. Therefore, the
Maryland court is as liberal in excusing poor judgment as it is rigid in
punishing self-dealing or dishonesty. 7 Only gross negligence tantamount to
recklessness or fraud will be punished.
72
Where the board of directors approved a loan to a financially threatened
company which soon went insolvent, the court found no waste of corporate
assets.73 It conceded that the defendant directors might have been
imprudent, but the court refused to scrutinize their business judgment
where the facts revealed no "gross negligence and inattention to the duties
of their trust .... "74
However, when negligence is alleged and there is an element of self-deal-
ing, the court is more likely to find liability for mismanagement, if not gross
negligence. Where the corporation sustained a loss due to loans executed to
the directors from corporate funds, the court found gross negligence and
culpable mismangement.7 5 In the earliest of these cases, the court held
the directors personally liable for the loss to the corporation caused by their
loans to another director.7 6 While this case was a gross negligence action,
it had overtones of directors' exercising their selfish interests by "team
playing." It is easier for the court to find gross negligence if some self-inter-
est is present.
In Murphy v. Penniman7 7 the directors discovered that a fellow officer
had misappropriated $78,000.00 of corporate funds. The directors voted to
construe the misappropriation as a loan, and accepted from the debtor a
written promise of payment secured by collateral valued at only $50,000.00.
The court found this action to be a business judgment. It was in the board's
discretion to determine if getting at least $50,000.00 was best for the
corporation; however, the court found gross negligence on the part of the
entire board where the same officer who misappropriated the funds was
retained as treasurer and later promoted to vice-president. It held that the
stockholders could recover from the directors if they could prove that this
action caused the ultimate financial destruction of the corporation.78
A director of a finance corporation was also liable for gross negligence
70. Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md. 419, 438 (1881).
71. Cf., Burkhart v. Smith, 161 Md. 398, 157 A. 299 (1931).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 403, 157 A. at 301. This case involved an interlocking directorate which, as stated
above, does not presume unfair personal interest. See also Booth v. Robinson, 55 Md.
419 (1881).
75. Devereux v. Berger, 264 Md. 20, 284 A.2d 605 (1971); Hagerstown Furniture v. Baker, 155
Md. 549, 142 A. 885 (1928); Murphy v. Penniman, 105 Md. 452, 66 A. 282 (1907).
76. Murphy v. Penniman, 105 Md. at 463. Although the by-laws prohibited such loans, it was
not the determinative factor in the outcome of the case.
77. 105 Md. 452 (1907).
78. Id. This is distinguishable from the personal interest cases, in which no loss to the
corporation need be shown. This is an important factor for the plaintiff to consider before
deciding under which theory to bring his action.
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when he caused the corporation to borrow money at 12 percent interest and
reloan it to another company for 9 percent interest. 7 9 Although he was pres-
ident of the second corporation, an intentional diversion of corporate funds
would have been more difficult than negligence because the transactions be-
tween interlocking directorates are presumptively fair,
While these cases indicate that Maryland holds a director liable only for
gross negligence, holding him to the standard of care that he would use in
the conduct of his own affairs,8 ° a conflict in jurisdictions exists as to the
standard of care required. An early Pennsylvania cases ' took a position
similar to that of Maryland. The court said that only "gross inattention"
tantamount to fraud is culpable while "mistakes of judgment" are not.8 2 A
leading New York case rejected this conclusion saying that a director must
exercise "ordinary skill and judgment."8 3 The court analogized the direc-
tor's position to that of a trustee. It stated that to hold him to "only slight
care to the duties of his trust .... "84 undermines the confidence which
investors must place in him. Later New York cases 85 failed to maintain this
standard. Instead, the court adopted a theory similar to the Maryland and
Pennsylvania decisions. It said that the best interest of the corporation is
served by the exercise of the directors' "honest and unselfish decision" even
though it may be viewed subsequently as "unwise or inexpedient."
86
The rule that a director is excused from liability for anything but the
grossest of negligence is characterized as the "business judgment" rule.8 7
The conflict between this position and the rule of ordinary care and
judgment is illustrated in an early Supreme Court decision. 88 There,
outside directors of a national bank were sued for dereliction of duty. The
allegation was that they had utterly failed to supervise the officers of the
bank with the result that the officers completely milked the bank, leaving it
insolvent. The majority opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, while paying
lip service to the rule of ordinary care, so evaluated the facts that the case
must stand as a high-water mark of judicial permissiveness. Four Justices
dissented, led by Mr. Justice Harlan. The dissenting opinion noted
sarcastically:
Upon his [the director's] theory of duty [accepted by the majority
opinion], the only need for directors of a national bank is to meet,
take the required oath to administer its business diligently and
honestly, turn over all its affairs to the fontrol of some one or more
of its officers, and never go near the bank again, unless they are
79. Devereux v. Berger, 264 Md. 20, 284 A.2d 605 (1971).
80. Phoenix Sav. & Loan, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Serv. Co., 427 F.2d 862, 868 (4th Cir. 1970).
81. Sperling's Appeal, 71 Pa. 11 (1872).
82. Id. at 24.
83. Hun v. Cary, 82 N.Y. 65, 71 (1880).
84. Id. at 72.
85. See, e.g., Pollitz v. Wabash R.R. Co., 207 N.Y. 113, 100 N.E. 721 (1912).
86. Id. at 124, 100 N.E. at 724.
87. Murphy v. Penniman, 105 Md. 452 (1907).
88. Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
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notified to come there, or until they are informed that there is
something wrong. And when it is ascertained that these officers or
some of them, while in full control, have embezzled or recklessly
squandered the assets of the bank, the only comfort that swindled
stockholders and depositors have is the assurance, not that the
directors have themselves diligently administered the affairs of the
bank, or diligently supervised the conduct of those to whom its
affairs were committed by them, but that they had confidence in
the integrity and fidelity of its officers and agents, and relied upon
their assurance that all was right.... Such a system cannot be
properly characterized otherwise than as a farce.8
9
There is a persuasive argument for the application of the "business
judgment" rule at least where outside directors are concerned, though it has
not been expressly recognized by the courts. Practical experience and actual
interviews with directors and management of large corporations show that
the functions of outside directors are limited. Professor Myles L. Mace has
suggested that outside directors do no more than serve as sources of advice
and counsel on very broad questions of policy, and as some sort of discipline
in requiring management to prepare periodic reports to the board. Directors
serve actively only in the event of a crisis, such as the death of the president
or a tender or take-over offer.90 In such circumstances, then, it would be
basically unfair to impose a standard of reasonable care and diligence.
Rather, all that can be expected is liability for gross negligence or
inattention to duty. Moreover, the imposition of a higher standard would
not necessarily result in better service by the director.9 1 Human nature
being what it is and possessing a strong instinct for self-preservation,
directors would seek, perhaps successfully, to avoid the liabilities imposed
by a higher standard through the methods of liability insurance or
indemnification by their corporation.9 2 If these avenues of escape were
89. Id. at 168-69.
90. See generally M. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971), a three year study based
upon extensive interviews and research. Professor Mace quotes, with obvious relish, from
many of his interviews. For example, on whether outside directors ask discerning
questions, he quotes one chairman:
A board meeting is not a good place, relatively speaking, to raise questions. The
reason is a sort of atmospheric reason. The fellow board member who has interest
enough or knowledge enough to challenge the management with a perceptive
question is probably very much in the minority. In most cases he is the one guy on
the board who has some interest and feeling, and the rest of the characters on the
board haven't read the material, don't know the business, can't make any sensible
response with justification, and they are not really interested in getting into it. Id.
at 52.
91. See Conrad, A Behavioral Analysis of Directors' Liability for Negligence, 1972 DUKE L. J.
895 (No. 5).
92. Though liability insurance may appear to be the salvation of the corporate director, it is
not the total solution to the problem. Beside the expense and difficulty of finding
coverage, policies may be vague, and their terms are always subject to interpretation by
the law and by the control of the corporate code. It is difficult for a director to know
whether a particular negligent act is covered until after the fact. In general, intentional
acts of wrongdoing cannot be insured as a matter of public policy though some jurisdic-
tions may permit it. For a discussion of the pitfalls and advantages of liability insurance
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closed, persons might refuse to serve as directors, or directors might
attempt to build "paper shelters," establishing a record of diligence without
any necessary correlation to actual diligence. 93
Nevertheless, many observers of the corporate entity believe that
directors will, in many areas, eventually become liable for negligent
action.94 As reviewed below in the discussion of liability under federal law,
such liability may already exist in certain areas of directors' action relating
to the issuance of securities.
Finally, it is important to point out that gross negligence may be
established not only if a director fails to act affirmatively in the best
interests of the corporation, but also if he fails to act at all when there is a
duty to do so. 9 5 A director may not insulate himself from corporate affairs to
such an extent that his attentiveness is less than that which "a discrete
businessman would exercise over his own affairs .... "96
For example, where supervision of corporate employees is at issue in the
determination of misfeasance (which is generally non-actionable) or non-
feasance (which is generally actionable), the size of the corporation is an
important factor. 97 Directors of a corporation with 30,000 employees are
entitled to rely on employee honesty until put on notice of a wrongdoing, 9
while directors of a small corporation may have a duty to actively supervise
their employees. 99 Of course, directors with knowledge of employee miscon-
duct have a fiduciary duty to act, regardless of the size of the corporation. 1 00
III. LIABILITY UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
The influence of the federal securities laws'01 has been so pervasive and
widespread in the past several years that many practitioners are beginning
to refer to them as "the federal law of corporations." The purpose of these
laws is to "insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets" 1 2 in
for corporate directors see S. Miller and J. Subak, Lessons for Future Counselling of In-
surers Involving Ethics, Liabilities, and Securities Regulation: Impact of Federal Securities
Laws: of Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 30 Bus. LAW. 387 (1975); J. Hinsey and W.
DeLancey, Directors and Officers Liability Insurance-An Approach to Its Evaluation and
A Checklist, 23 Bus. LAW. 869 (1968).
93. Conrad, supra n. 91 at 903-04.
94. Cary & Harris, Standards of Conduct under Common Law, Present Day and the Model
Act, 27 Bus. LAW. 61, 70 (spec. issue, Feb. 1972).
95. Parish v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers' Ass'n, Inc., 250 Md. 24, 76, 242 A.2d 512
(1968).
96. Fisher v. Parr, 92 Md. 245, 48 A. 621 (1901).
97. Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, 41 Del. Ch. 78, 188 A.2d 135 (1963).
98. Id.
99. Fisher v. Parr, 92 Md. 245, 48 A. 621 (1901).
100. Parish v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers' Ass'n, Inc., 250 Md. 24, 242 A.2d 512 (1968).
101. The Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Investment Company
Act of 1940 have generated the greatest activity and interest.
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1970). The other enumerated purposes of this Act are "to protect
interstate commerce, the national credit, the Federal taxing power,... the national
banking system and Federal Reserve System...."
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securities exchanges, in order to "protect the uninformed, ignorant, and
gullible"' 10 3 investor. The widespread use of securities as the financing
foundation of our economic structure created the potential for their misuse
by directors to defraud the public. 104 Sections 77 and 78 of the United
States Code, Title 15105 exemplify the congressional effort to "prevent
the ... exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, fraudulent and
worthless securities through misrepresentation' 116 and distortion of the
market value of the enterprise involved. 0 7 To accomplish this, Congress
required the full and fair disclosure of all securities sold in interstate com-
merce or through any instrumentality thereof.'0 8
Because of the rigid structure and remedial purpose of the federal
securities laws, the benefits to a plaintiff of proceeding under them instead
of state laws is enormous. The standard of care imposed by federal law upon
directors is more strict and the procedural problems are less cumbersome.
For example, many states have "security for expense" statutes which
require that the plaintiff post sufficient security to finance his challenge. 0 9
Also there can be problems in service of process and in establishing
jurisdiction and venue, particularly where there are multiple defendants.
Under federal law there is: no security for expenses, worldwide service of
process, liberal discovery and class action procedures, relatively liberal
rules on derivative suits and jury trials, broad venue, no minimum on the
amount of money in controversy, and no requirement for diversity of
citizenship.110
Like state laws, the federal statutes impose specific duties and liabilities
upon directors. Three significant portions of the federal securities laws
which will be discussed herein are Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, and Rule 10b-5.
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act imposes liability upon
directors and officers for short-swing profits. The liability for such profits
incurs from the use by a beneficial owner, officer or director of inside
information to sell a security for profit within six months of its purchase.
This section generally applies irrespective of the intent of the director and
whether he acted in good or bad faith."'I It is construed strictly so that if
computation of profit can be done by more than one method, that method
103. Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 342 F.2d 596, 602 (7th Cir. 1965).
104. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is "essentially directed at fraud, not against mere
negligence or errors of judgment on the part of the broker." Hecht v. Harris, Upham &
Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 430 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
105. These sections encode the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
respectively.
106. El Khadem v. Equity Sec. Corp., 494 F.2d 1224 n.7 (9th Cir. 1974).
107. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 910 (1973).
108. Texas Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Bond Co., 187 F. Supp. 14 (W.D. Ky. 1960).
109. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 34 (West 1955); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney
1963); TEX. Bus. CORP. AcT art 5.14.C (Vernon Supp. 1974).
110. A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD, SEC. RULE 10b-5, 0.84.4-.5 (1967).
111. Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Andreas, 239 F. Supp. (S.D. N.Y. 1965); Lockheed
Aircraft Corp. v. Campbell, 110 F. Supp. 282 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
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yielding the highest profit for the plaintiff is used.I1 2 A suit for recovery of
such profits may be brought within two years by any person who owns
securities of the issuer or by the issuer itself. Because the information used
by the director was obtained through his position as an insider, a 16(b) ac-
tion is somewhat analogous to a common law suit for breach of fiduciary
duty through insider trading.
Section 11 of the Securities-Act of 1933 imposes liability upon directors
and officers if securities are issued pursuant to a registration statement
which contains untrue statements or omits to make statements of material
fact. In the famous case of Escott v. BarChris Construction Co." 3 the
district court examined in detail the duties of both inside and outside direc-
tors concerning the preparation of a registration statement and the result-
ing issuance of stock. Under Section 11(a) (2) an injured purchaser may
sue all directors of the corporation that issued the misleading registration
statement. If the statement was "purporting to be a copy of... a report or
valuation of an expert .... 11 4 subsection (b)(3) allows the vulnerable
directors to avoid liability by proving that "[they] had, after a reasonable
investigation, reasonable ground to believe and did believe... that the
statements therein were true and that there was no omission to state a
material fact....",H The court specifically considered whether the direc-
tors had sustained their burden of proof under Section 11(b)(3). The court
found that they did not.
Thus liability for negligence is significantly different under the federal
securities law from common law theories of director liability in at least two
respects. First, an affirmative duty is imposed upon the director, even in the
absence of self-dealing, to institute a reasonable investigation. This
contrasts with the freedom afforded by the "business judgment" rule
asserted by the common law.1"6 Secondly, the burden is placed upon the
director to prove his compliance with the exculpatory portions of the
statute.
While BarChris arose in the context of a corporate stock issuance, its
lessons are equally applicable to all statements and reports filed pursuant
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Other documents subject to the
section are the periodic reports which a reporting company must file under
Section 13 and the proxy materials filed under Section 14. While the outside
director may not have the same degree of statutory responsibility for those
reports as he does under the Securities Act, he probably will be held liable if
he fails to make a reasonable inquiry or investigation of such reports. 7
112. Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1943);
Newmark v. RKO Gen., Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854
(1970).
113. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
115. Id.
116. Indeed, the underwriter defendants in BarChris attempted to rely upon Litwin v. Allen,
25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940), saying that they were entitled to assume that the
officers of the company were honest. Judge McLean refused to accept this analogy. Escott
v. BarChris Constr. Co., 283 F. Supp. 643, 696 (S.D. N.Y. 1968).
117. Meeker, The Outside Director - Advice to My Client, 24 Bus. LAW. 573, 580 (1969).
[Vol. 4
A Director's Fiduciary Duties
A significant sequel to BarChris is Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip-
ment Corp.118 Both inside and outside directors were sued under Section,
11 of the Securities Act of 1933, for alleged material misrepresentations
contained in a prospectus issued by Leasco, in making a tender offer for
the stock of Reliance Insurance Company. The inside director was held
liable; however, the court exonerated the outside director, who was also an
officer of the managing underwriter. This decision makes clear the rigors of
the inside director's burden of affirmatively investigating all of the com-
pany's activities.
Since Feit, moreover, the inside director's burden is nearly impossible to
meet. There was no question of the honesty of the Leasco directors, but
Judge Weinstein noted, in analyzing their duty:
BarChris imposes such stringent requirements of knowledge of
corporate affairs on inside directors that one is led to the conclusion
that liability will lie in practically all cases of misrepresentation.
Their liability approaches that of the issuer as guarantor of the
accuracy of the prospectus." 9
A similarly critical area of directors' duties arises under Rule 10b-5.12 °
This rule regulates purchases and sales of securities and creates substantial
concerns for the director, both when he has a personal interest in the
securities transaction and when he does not. The scope of the Rule has
constantly expanded since it was first held in 1947 that a private right of
action was created by a violation of Rule 10b-5. 12 1 It is impossible to
analyze completely the Rule in this article1 22 but certain features of the
Rule are important to a proper analysis of a director's liability.
One significant feature is that a director or officer may not trade for his
own account in the stock of his company using undisclosed and material,
inside information. This is the lesson of the leading case of SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulfur Co.
12 3
118. 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D. N.Y. 1971).
119. Id. at 578. See also, Folk, Civil Liabilities under the Federal Securities Acts: The BarChris
Case (pt. 1), 55 VA. L. REV. 1(1969).
120. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1942):
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statement made, in the light of circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
121. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947), modified, 83 F. Supp.
613 (1947).
122. For an exhaustive treatment of Rule 10b-5 see A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD, SEC.
RULE 10b-5 (1967); J. FLOM, B. GARFINKEL & J. FREUND, DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS OF
PUBLIC COMPANIES AND INSIDERS (1967).
123. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969), 404 U.S. 1005 (1971), reh.
denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1972). The court held that a director of the company could not
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Many practitioners have approached the Texas Gulf decision as present-
ing an ultimatum to the director of either disclosing or violating the Rule.
Since, as explained below, even a consciencious director can never be sure
he has made full disclosure, the threat of liability is always present under
that analysis. An obvious alternative is for the insider not to trade for his
own account. This third alternative is the safest for a director or other
insider and avoids the difficult task of balancing legitimate corporate
concerns for nondisclosure against the public policy arguments that trading
must be based upon full and truthful disclosure of material information. 
124
The director should adopt a very broad view of materiality. The mere fact
that he purchased shares may be used as evidence that he considered the
undisclosed information to be material. 125 At the very least, he must
recognize that the test of materiality will be judged on the basis cf
hindsight, and that materiality may encompass ."any fact.., which in rea-
sonable and objective contemplation might affect the value of the corpora-
tion's stock or securities. . "... ,,16 The director will not escape liability if,
rather than trading for himself in his corporation's securities, he passes the
inside information to a friend or relative who then trades. The director will
be branded a "tippor" and will be subject, at the very least, to injunctive
action12 7 and possibly to civil suits seeking to hold him liable for the profits
made by his "tippee." 12
8
A second important application of Rule 10b-5 is that directors and
officers may be charged for breach of fiduciary duty in cases involving a
securities transaction and a conflict of interest. The leading case is
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,1 29 where a stockholder's derivative suit was
brought against certain directors of Banff Oil Ltd. alleging that the
directors, having knowledge of certain oil discoveries, issued stock of Banff
to its controlling stockholder at a grossly inadequate price. The district
court had entered summary judgment for all defendants, but was reversed
on appeal. The court of appeals ruled that the complaint stated a cause of
action in that the directors of Banff may have defrauded their corporation
trade in the stock of the company while material information had not been disclosed-
that the directors had acted to reduce the dividend. The SEC disciplined a broker who
had obtained this inside information from the director and sold shares of the company's
stock before news of the reduction had been made public.
124. While this third course will insulate the director from liability, the corporation itself may
have to wrestle with only the two choices-to disclose or to violate the Rule. Still unclear
is whether the corporation will be held liable to private investors in the absence of some
form of scienter. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d at 866-68 (dissenting opinion).
125. Id.; Faberge, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10174 (May 25, 1973); see
also, In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
126. List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811
(1965), reh. denied, 382 U.S. 933 (1965); citing, Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642
(7th Cir. 1963); accord, SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968).
127. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 401 F.2d at 852.
128. DeLancey, Rule lOb-5-A Recent Profile, 25 Bus. LAW. 1355, 1361-62 (1970); cf., Finan-
cial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 315 F. Supp. 42 (D.Col. 1970).
129. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd en banc, 405 F.2d 215, cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
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by causing Banff to receive less for the sale of its shares than it should
have. 130
The importance of Schoenbaum lies in the fact that it overruled the
earlier proposition, derived from Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp.,1 31 that
corporate mismanagement, even if fraudulent, could not be litigated under
Rule 10b-5. It still may be possible to argue that Rule 10b-5 will not reach
corporate mismanagement if the alleged securities transaction is merely
incidental to the mismanagement. 132
A further expansion of Rule 10b-5 will be realized if the "purchaser-
seller" requirement of Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp. is rejected. Birn-
baum established that, in order for a plaintiff to have standing, he must be
either a purchaser or seller of securities. This status was considered essen-
tial because of the concluding phrase of Rile 10b-5, "in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security." Although Birnbaum had been criticized
over the years, 1 3 3 and although several exceptions had been established,134
its holding was not challenged directly until the decision of the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in Eason v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.135
The Seventh Circuit affirmatively answered the question "whether not-
withstanding the fact that they are neither purchasers nor sellers of
security, plaintiffs may obtain relief under Rule 10b-5."1 36
While there must still be a purchase or sale of a security,137 if the other
circuits or the Supreme Court 38 adopt the holding that the plaintiff need
130. Id. at 219. Judge Medina said in his dissent:
This does indeed open the flood gates. For the result is to transform a simple cause
of action against directors for waste or the use of bad judgment in the sale of
corporate assets into a federal securities fraud case by judicial fiat. In my opinion
the Congress never intended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to be interpreted
so broadly as this. Id. at 220.
131. 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952); followed in O'Neill v.
Maytag, 339 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1964); Lester v. Preco Indus., Inc., 282 F. Supp. 459 (S.D.
N.Y. 1965).
132. Tully v. Mott Supermarkets, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 834, 842 (D. N.J. 1972):
It would be inaccurate to conclude that Rule 10b-5 jurisdiction exists in a case of
nothing more than corporate mismanagement where the purchase or sale of stock
has a purely speculative impact on the cause of action. But, where there is a causal
connection between the purchase or sale of stock, the alleged fraud or breach of
fiduciary duty, and plaintiffs loss, then federal jurisdiction under 10b-5 exists.
133. See, e.g., Lowenfels, The Demise of The Birnbaum Doctrine: A New Era for Rule 10b-5,
54 VA. L. REV. 268 (1968); Ruder, Current Developments in the Federal Law of Corporate
Fiduciary Relations - Standing to Sue under Rule lOb-5, 26 Bus. LAW. 1289 (1971).
134. See Ruder, id. at 1296-1300, listing the derivative action exception, the forced seller
exception, mergers and liquidations, proxy rule cases and the injunction exception; see
also, A. S. Jacobs, Birnbaum in Flux: Significant 10b-5 Developments, 2 SEC. L. J. 305
(1975).
135. 490 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
136. Id. at 656.
137. In re Penn Cent. Sec. Litigation, 494 F.2d 528, 533 (3d Cir. 1974).
138. The Supreme Court's opinion in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6 (1971), may be read as implying a disposition to do away with the purchaser-seller
requirement. id. at 12. However, the Court has also shown a reluctance to become
embroiled in the dispute, since it denied certiorari in Eason, despite the obvious conflict
among the circuits.
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not be a purchaser or seller, it will enormously enlarge the application of
Rule 10b-5 and greatly increase the number of situations to which it will
apply. Thus nonselling stockholders who see their shares diminish in value
as the result of a fraudulent tender offer or merger; or who have their shares
diluted by the improper issuance of stock to insiders; or who find the value
of their shares decreasing as a result of mismanagement, fraud or manipula-
tion by insiders, all may find standing to sue under Rule 10b-5. Naturally
the corresponding duties and liabilities of the officers and directors will be
increased substantially.
This possible expansion of the Rule's application brings into sharp focus
the current issue of the duty of care which must be exercised to avoid
liability in Rule 10b-5 cases. The question is whether the standard is
flexible and dependent upon the circumstances or controlled by an
affirmative act such as fraud or scienter. The Second Circuit in Lanza v.
Drexel & Co. 1 39 concluded that the liability for misrepresentation of a
director who has no conflict of interest would not attach without the
presence of the element of willfulness or recklessness. 14 Lanza was a suit by
the stockholders of a small company who had entered into a stock exchange
with BarChris Construction Company. The plaintiffs could not claim the
protection of Section 11 of the Securities Act as the exchange was
admittedly not a public issue and was, therefore, exempt from the
registration requirements and concomitant liabilities under the 1933 Act.
Thus they brought suit against the former officers and directors under Rule
10b-5. The court was concerned primarily with the duty owed by an outside
director and refused to apply a negligence standard, saying, "In sum, we
believe that proof of a willful or reckless disregard for the truth is necessary
to establish liability under Rule 10b-5."'
4 1
The Ninth Circuit came to a different conclusion. That court, in White v.
Abrams,142 expressly refused to follow Lanza. It rejected the attempt to
compartmentalize the defendant's state of mind, whether using the term
"scienter" or the term "negligence." Rather, it insisted that a "flexible
standard" was necessary in order "to meet the varied factual contexts with-
out inhibiting the standard with traditional fault concepts which tend to
cloud rather than clarify."' 143 The court listed a number of factors which
139. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973).
140. Id. at 1299.
141. Id. In a footnote, the Court said:
In determining was [sic) constitutes "willful or reckless disregard for the truth"
the inquiry normally will be to determine whether the defendants knew the
material facts misstated or omitted, or failed or refused, after being put on notice
of a possible material failure of disclosure, to apprise themselves of the facts where
they could have done so without any extraordinary effort .... The answer to the
inquiry will of course depend upon the circumstances of the particular case,
including the nature and duties of the corporate positions held by the defendants.
Id. at 1306.
142. 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974). White was not a suit against either directors or officers, but
the court's analysis makes it clear that the same approach would have been followed had
the defendants been directors or officers.
143. Id. at 734.
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should be considered in defining, on a case by case basis, the duty imposed
by Rule 10b-5 upon the defendant:
a) the relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff;
b) defendant's access to information as compared to plaintiff's;
c) the benefit defendant derives from the relationship or transac-
tion; 144
d) defendant's awareness of whether plaintiff was relying upon their
relationship in making his investment decisions; and
e) defendant's activity in initiating the securities transaction in
question. 145
What lies in the future for directors under Rule 10b-5? The answer seems
to be increasing litigation and liability.With a movement toward an in-
creased scope of the Rule as exemplified in Eason and a flexible duty of care
as espoused in White v. Abrams, the director will be less certain of his
liabilities and more apprehensive about serving as a director.
CONCLUSION
In this review of state and federal law, it is apparent that the duties of the
corporate director are broad, varied and, at present, expanding. It is also
clear that in many critical areas the duties may be difficult to classify in a
structured manner. Unless there is reference to a particular factual situa-
tion, a director's exposure can be expressed only in generalities which ap-
proach the quality of platitudes. It is interesting to note that the Securities
and Exchange Commission has abandoned its recent efforts to develop a set
of guidelines on the duties of a director because of a recognition that differ-
ent types of directors may require different standards of responsibility." 6
The lawyer who is called upon to advise a director of his duties and
responsibilities must attempt to identify the most sensitive areas such as;
conflict of interest situations, the issuance of securities by the corporation,
144. The court may have had in mind situations involving conflicts of interest.
145. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d at 735-36. The Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuits seem to be
in a state of flux on the scienter versus flexible standard issue, but they are leaning
toward the ruling in White v. Abrams. Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir.
1963); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 18th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968);
Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965).
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits are aligned with the Second Circuit. Sargent v. Genesco,
Inc., 492 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1974); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); SEC v.
Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974).
The Third Circuit admits that it has not faced the scienter versus negligence issue.
Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3d Cir. 1974). Likewise the Fourth Circuit
has not addressed the issue directly. Baumel v. Rosen, 283 F. Supp. 128, 139 (D.C. Md.
1968), affd in part, rev'd in part, 412 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
1037 (1969).
146. SEC Press Release (Dec. 17, 1974) supra, n. 12.
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and the trading in the corporation's securities when material information
concerning the corporation has not been disclosed.
In the final analysis, the director will have to consider his personal
conduct in a myriad of factual situations, guided perhaps by two essential
principles-a diligent concern for fairness and loyalty, and a realization
that the assets of the corporation belong to the stockholders and not to him.
